Trump’s 28-Point Ukraine “Peace Plan”, Russian Provocations, and the Tough Winter Ahead

Based on a conversation between host of The Global Gambit and Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London.

Introduction

A leaked 28-point “peace plan” linked to Donald Trump has recently attracted media attention as a possible framework to end the Russia–Ukraine war. Sir Lawrence Freedman argues that, although the document has to be taken seriously because of its political origins, it is badly drafted, politically unworkable, and strategically dangerous if treated as a real basis for negotiations.

In this discussion, Freedman examines:

Where the plan came from and why it is so problematic
Why it gives “too much” to Russia and still not enough for Putin
How Europe and the United States should respond
Russian grey-zone provocations in the North Sea and Poland
The evolving battle for the Ukrainian city of Prosk and the wider military balance
The looming pressures of winter and the economic strain on Russia

1. Where the 28-Point Peace Plan Came From

The plan did not emerge from official diplomacy between Moscow and Kyiv. Instead, it surfaced via a leak to Axios and was then picked up by other media outlets. According to Freedman, the Russian side of this initiative appears to be driven by Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian sovereign wealth fund, who is not a professional diplomat but has contacts and business interests in the United States. On the American side, it involves figures like Richard Grenell / Witco/Witkoff–type operators who also lack deep experience in formal peace negotiations.

Crucially:

The plan was not discussed with the Ukrainian government.
The plan was not discussed with the Russian government as an official offer.
Its political “status” only increased because the leak forced others to respond to it.

Because Donald Trump appears to support it and may be encouraging Volodymyr Zelensky to consider it, the proposal cannot simply be ignored, even if it is deeply flawed.

2. What the Plan Proposes – and Why It’s a “Dog’s Breakfast”

Freedman describes the text as “incredibly amateurish” and “a dog’s breakfast”:

Drafting problems: clumsy wording, arbitrary phrasing, and clear absence of international lawyers or experienced diplomats.
Contradictions: the document promises things that either don’t need to be promised or cannot realistically be enforced.
Lack of mechanisms: no serious framework for implementation, monitoring, or dispute resolution.

2.1. Military Limits and EU Membership

Some provisions look superficially significant:

Ukraine would be allowed a force of around 500,000–600,000 troops, far more than earlier proposals (which once mentioned a cap around 85,000).
Russia would accept Ukraine’s eventual membership in the European Union, although not in NATO.

Freedman notes that:

EU membership is no longer a core red line for Moscow; in fact, trying to block a simple association agreement in 2013 is what helped trigger this entire crisis.
Limits on troop numbers are politically irritating to Kyiv (“Why should we be capped at all?”) and likely meaningless in practice, especially since the plan does not clearly limit tanks, aircraft, or long-range systems.

2.2. “De Facto” Control and the Donbas Problem

One of the most controversial sections concerns:

De facto Russian control of occupied parts of Donbas and Zaporizhzhia
Turning other contested areas into a demilitarized neutral zone

Freedman argues this is both politically and practically nonsensical:

“De facto” control is not the same as legal recognition; Russia has formally annexed these territories and wants that annexation recognized.
The notion of transforming heavily fortified, mined, populated areas into a “neutral zone” ignores the reality on the ground.
Putin has demanded more than the plan offers; anything short of fully recognized annexation is unlikely to satisfy him.

2.3. Security Guarantees Stronger Than NATO’s Article 5

The plan envisages security guarantees for Ukraine that:

Forbid foreign (European) troops from being stationed in Ukraine.
Allow air support and a possible no-fly zone enforced from neighboring countries like Poland.
Include a clause in which the United States organizes “decisive force” if Russia breaks the agreement – arguably stronger than NATO’s Article 5, which only requires each member to “consider” what action to take.

For Freedman, this creates a paradox:

From Moscow’s perspective, this looks like NATO by other means, even while formally excluding Ukraine from NATO.
From Kyiv’s perspective, it is credible: will the US really unleash decisive force on its own if Russia violates the deal?

The result is a document that neither side can trust and that, in its current form, is simply not implementable.

3. Why Neither Russia nor Ukraine Can Accept the Plan

3.1. The Ukrainian Dilemma

Zelensky is already under political pressure at home due to corruption scandals and war fatigue. Accepting an obviously pro-Russian peace plan would not strengthen him domestically; it would likely weaken him further. Public opinion and political elites in Ukraine are strongly opposed.

As Freedman puts it:

Zelensky must “take it seriously” at the diplomatic level because of who is pushing it.
But he cannot accept it without destroying his own legitimacy.

3.2. The Russian Calculus

Paradoxically, Moscow also has reasons to dislike the proposal:

It gives Russia a lot, but less than it has asked for, especially regarding formal recognition of annexed territory.
It offers weak guarantees on the lifting of sanctions.
It does not return seized Russian assets in the way the Kremlin would demand.

For the moment, Russia can simply wait for others to reject it and play for time. Anyone “with any sense,” Freedman suggests, recognises that the plan, as drafted, is not a serious basis for peace.

4. Europe, the United States, and a Growing Grey-Zone Conflict

4.1. Russian Provocations in the North Sea and Poland

While this diplomatic theatre unfolds, Russia is stepping up grey-zone operations:

Ships like Yantar operating near undersea infrastructure in the North Sea, using lasers and other equipment.
Sabotage incidents in and around Poland and the Baltic region.

Freedman sees a pattern of risk-taking and probing:

Each incident is relatively limited, but cumulatively they raise the chance that something goes badly wrong.
There is a real danger that one of these operations causes deaths or major infrastructure damage, pushing the situation beyond the “grey zone.”

4.2. Are We at War With Russia?

Freedman stops short of calling this a full-scale war between Russia and NATO:

There is no direct shooting war between NATO and Russia.
Diplomatic relations still exist.
However, we are in a zone “not far short of it” in some respects.

He argues for a balance between panic and complacency:

Do not downplay the seriousness of the situation.
But also avoid apocalyptic rhetoric that implies imminent total war.

4.3. What Europe Should Do

Freedman believes Europe should:

Increase defense spending and accelerate delivery of support to Ukraine.
Develop a more active diplomatic role instead of leaving initiatives to ad-hoc US-Russian channels.
Show readiness to take tougher measures in response to Russian provocations (for example, seizing suspect ships), while being prepared for potential escalation.

At the same time, Europe is deeply entangled with the United States on intelligence and security, especially the UK, making a complete decoupling from Washington both unrealistic and undesirable.

5. The Battle for Prosk and the Military Balance

5.1. Prosk: Symbolic Prize, Limited Strategic Value

Russia has been trying to capture the Ukrainian city of Prosk for around 15 months, losing tens of thousands of soldiers in the process. Freedman notes that:

Prosk is no longer a key logistics hub for Ukraine because drones have made such hubs extremely vulnerable.
Militarily, Russia could have bypassed the city and moved on to other targets.
Politically, however, Putin has invested so much personal prestige in its fall that Russia has concentrated about a third of its front-line activity there.

This is what Freedman calls a classic example of a strategic fixation: a secondary objective that becomes central for reasons of prestige and politics, tying down resources that might be better used elsewhere.

5.2. Ukraine’s Trade-Off: Holding or Withdrawing

On the Ukrainian side:

Defending Prosk offers propaganda value and attritional benefit, killing large numbers of Russian attackers.
The city is supplied through a corridor that still exists; if that corridor is threatened, withdrawal becomes necessary to avoid encirclement.
At some point, Kyiv must ask where its limited manpower and reserves are most useful; the answer may not always be “Prosk.”

Freedman warns that staying too long, as in Bakhmut, risks losing elite units in a battle that no longer makes strategic sense.

5.3. Manpower, Drones, and Tactics

Both sides face manpower and equipment challenges:

Ukraine arguably should have mobilized more people in 2022, but political and social constraints made that difficult.
The Ukrainian army is not homogeneous: some units are better led, better equipped, and better able to recruit than others.
Ukraine has adapted by using very thin front lines where troops focus on spotting Russian movements and directing rear-area fire, heavily relying on drones.
Russia has caught up significantly in drone warfare, reducing Ukraine’s earlier advantage.

Both militaries now struggle to decide where to place scarce reserves, and both are thinly spread across a wide front.

6. Winter, Economics, and the Long War

6.1. Surviving the Winter

For Ukraine, the next winter will be brutal:

Civilians will endure cold, electricity shortages, and attacks on energy infrastructure.
Military units suffer fatigue, lack of sleep, and harsh frontline conditions.

If Ukraine can hold the line through winter until February or March:

The coercive impact of Russia’s attacks on critical infrastructure may diminish with warmer weather.
If the front has not moved significantly, the psychological and political pressure on Russia increases: huge costs for limited gains.

6.2. Russia’s War Economy

Russia is devoting an enormous share of its state budget and GDP to the war:

War spending is projected to reach a very large share of national resources.
Public services and civilian infrastructure are deteriorating as funds are diverted to the military.
Ukrainian drone and missile attacks on Russian oil refineries and other infrastructure impose increasing costs, especially if facilities are repeatedly struck after repairs.

Freedman does not predict a sudden collapse of the Russian economy, but he does see mounting long-term strain and difficult choices ahead for the Kremlin.

6.3. No Quick Ending – But Limits to Russian Gains

Freedman is not optimistic about a quick end to the war. Any sustainable settlement ultimately depends on a decision in Moscow:

Ukraine has no real choice but to continue fighting; its survival as a sovereign state is at stake.
Russia must eventually recognise that this is a futile, unwinnable war in strategic terms, even if it can still make incremental territorial gains.

Until then, the conflict is likely to continue as a grinding, costly struggle in which:

Russia’s progress remains “glacial,”
Ukraine needs sustained Western support to hold the line,
And diplomacy that gives “too much to Russia” without credible guarantees for Ukraine will keep failing.

Conclusion

The Trump-linked 28-point peace plan has forced governments and analysts to react, but as Sir Lawrence Freedman argues, it is neither legally sound nor politically viable. It offers a useful checklist of issues any real settlement must address, yet in its current form, it satisfies neither Kyiv nor Moscow and lacks the mechanisms needed for lasting peace.

Meanwhile, Russian grey-zone operations in Europe, the battle for Prosk, the strain of winter, and the cost of sustaining a war economy all point to a prolonged, dangerous phase of the conflict. The challenge for Ukraine and its supporters is to get through the coming months, strengthen Ukraine militarily and economically, and ensure that when diplomacy finally becomes meaningful, it does so from a position that does not reward aggression.